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|
\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
\
\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
\ the following conditions:
\
\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
\
\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
\ SOFTWARE.
\ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
\ Handshake processing code, for the client.
\ The common T0 code (ssl_hs_common.t0) shall be read first.
preamble {
/*
* This macro evaluates to a pointer to the client context, under that
* specific name. It must be noted that since the engine context is the
* first field of the br_ssl_client_context structure ('eng'), then
* pointers values of both types are interchangeable, modulo an
* appropriate cast. This also means that "addresses" computed as offsets
* within the structure work for both kinds of context.
*/
#define CTX ((br_ssl_client_context *)ENG)
/*
* Generate the pre-master secret for RSA key exchange, and encrypt it
* with the server's public key. Returned value is either the encrypted
* data length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
*
* This code assumes that the public key has been already verified (it
* was properly obtained by the X.509 engine, and it has the right type,
* i.e. it is of type RSA and suitable for encryption).
*/
static int
make_pms_rsa(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
{
const br_x509_class **xc;
const br_x509_pkey *pk;
const unsigned char *n;
unsigned char *pms;
size_t nlen, u;
xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
/*
* Compute actual RSA key length, in case there are leading zeros.
*/
n = pk->key.rsa.n;
nlen = pk->key.rsa.nlen;
while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
n ++;
nlen --;
}
/*
* We need at least 59 bytes (48 bytes for pre-master secret, and
* 11 bytes for the PKCS#1 type 2 padding). Note that the X.509
* minimal engine normally blocks RSA keys shorter than 128 bytes,
* so this is mostly for public keys provided explicitly by the
* caller.
*/
if (nlen < 59) {
return -BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY;
}
if (nlen > sizeof ctx->eng.pad) {
return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
/*
* Make PMS.
*/
pms = ctx->eng.pad + nlen - 48;
br_enc16be(pms, ctx->eng.version_max);
br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, pms + 2, 46);
br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, pms, 48);
/*
* Apply PKCS#1 type 2 padding.
*/
ctx->eng.pad[0] = 0x00;
ctx->eng.pad[1] = 0x02;
ctx->eng.pad[nlen - 49] = 0x00;
br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, ctx->eng.pad + 2, nlen - 51);
for (u = 2; u < nlen - 49; u ++) {
while (ctx->eng.pad[u] == 0) {
br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng,
&ctx->eng.pad[u], 1);
}
}
/*
* Compute RSA encryption.
*/
if (!ctx->irsapub(ctx->eng.pad, nlen, &pk->key.rsa)) {
return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
return (int)nlen;
}
/*
* OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
*/
static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
BR_HASH_OID_SHA1,
BR_HASH_OID_SHA224,
BR_HASH_OID_SHA256,
BR_HASH_OID_SHA384,
BR_HASH_OID_SHA512
};
/*
* Check the RSA signature on the ServerKeyExchange message.
*
* hash hash function ID (2 to 6), or 0 for MD5+SHA-1 (with RSA only)
* use_rsa non-zero for RSA signature, zero for ECDSA
* sig_len signature length (in bytes); signature value is in the pad
*
* Returned value is 0 on success, or an error code.
*/
static int
verify_SKE_sig(br_ssl_client_context *ctx,
int hash, int use_rsa, size_t sig_len)
{
const br_x509_class **xc;
const br_x509_pkey *pk;
br_multihash_context mhc;
unsigned char hv[64], head[4];
size_t hv_len;
xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
br_multihash_zero(&mhc);
br_multihash_copyimpl(&mhc, &ctx->eng.mhash);
br_multihash_init(&mhc);
br_multihash_update(&mhc,
ctx->eng.client_random, sizeof ctx->eng.client_random);
br_multihash_update(&mhc,
ctx->eng.server_random, sizeof ctx->eng.server_random);
head[0] = 3;
head[1] = 0;
head[2] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
head[3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
br_multihash_update(&mhc, head, sizeof head);
br_multihash_update(&mhc,
ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
if (hash) {
hv_len = br_multihash_out(&mhc, hash, hv);
if (hv_len == 0) {
return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
} else {
if (!br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_md5_ID, hv)
|| !br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_sha1_ID, hv + 16))
{
return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
hv_len = 36;
}
if (use_rsa) {
unsigned char tmp[64];
const unsigned char *hash_oid;
if (hash) {
hash_oid = HASH_OID[hash - 2];
} else {
hash_oid = NULL;
}
if (!ctx->eng.irsavrfy(ctx->eng.pad, sig_len,
hash_oid, hv_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp)
|| memcmp(tmp, hv, hv_len) != 0)
{
return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
}
} else {
if (!ctx->eng.iecdsa(ctx->eng.iec, hv, hv_len, &pk->key.ec,
ctx->eng.pad, sig_len))
{
return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Perform client-side ECDH (or ECDHE). The point that should be sent to
* the server is written in the pad; returned value is either the point
* length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
*
* The point _from_ the server is taken from ecdhe_point[] if 'ecdhe'
* is non-zero, or from the X.509 engine context if 'ecdhe' is zero
* (for static ECDH).
*/
static int
make_pms_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, unsigned ecdhe, int prf_id)
{
int curve;
unsigned char key[66], point[133];
const unsigned char *order, *point_src;
size_t glen, olen, point_len, xoff, xlen;
unsigned char mask;
if (ecdhe) {
curve = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
point_src = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point;
point_len = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
} else {
const br_x509_class **xc;
const br_x509_pkey *pk;
xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
curve = pk->key.ec.curve;
point_src = pk->key.ec.q;
point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
}
if ((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves & ((uint32_t)1 << curve)) == 0) {
return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
/*
* We need to generate our key, as a non-zero random value which
* is lower than the curve order, in a "large enough" range. We
* force top bit to 0 and bottom bit to 1, which guarantees that
* the value is in the proper range.
*/
order = ctx->eng.iec->order(curve, &olen);
mask = 0xFF;
while (mask >= order[0]) {
mask >>= 1;
}
br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, key, olen);
key[0] &= mask;
key[olen - 1] |= 0x01;
/*
* Compute the common ECDH point, whose X coordinate is the
* pre-master secret.
*/
ctx->eng.iec->generator(curve, &glen);
if (glen != point_len) {
return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
memcpy(point, point_src, glen);
if (!ctx->eng.iec->mul(point, glen, key, olen, curve)) {
return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
/*
* The pre-master secret is the X coordinate.
*/
xoff = ctx->eng.iec->xoff(curve, &xlen);
br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, point + xoff, xlen);
ctx->eng.iec->mulgen(point, key, olen, curve);
memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, point, glen);
return (int)glen;
}
/*
* Perform full static ECDH. This occurs only in the context of client
* authentication with certificates: the server uses an EC public key,
* the cipher suite is of type ECDH (not ECDHE), the server requested a
* client certificate and accepts static ECDH, the client has a
* certificate with an EC public key in the same curve, and accepts
* static ECDH as well.
*
* Returned value is 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int
make_pms_static_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
{
unsigned char point[133];
size_t point_len;
const br_x509_class **xc;
const br_x509_pkey *pk;
xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
if (point_len > sizeof point) {
return -1;
}
memcpy(point, pk->key.ec.q, point_len);
if (!(*ctx->client_auth_vtable)->do_keyx(
ctx->client_auth_vtable, point, &point_len))
{
return -1;
}
br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng,
prf_id, point, point_len);
return 0;
}
/*
* Compute the client-side signature. This is invoked only when a
* signature-based client authentication was selected. The computed
* signature is in the pad; its length (in bytes) is returned. On
* error, 0 is returned.
*/
static size_t
make_client_sign(br_ssl_client_context *ctx)
{
size_t hv_len;
/*
* Compute hash of handshake messages so far. This "cannot" fail
* because the list of supported hash functions provided to the
* client certificate handler was trimmed to include only the
* hash functions that the multi-hasher supports.
*/
if (ctx->hash_id) {
hv_len = br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
ctx->hash_id, ctx->eng.pad);
} else {
br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
br_md5_ID, ctx->eng.pad);
br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
br_sha1_ID, ctx->eng.pad + 16);
hv_len = 36;
}
return (*ctx->client_auth_vtable)->do_sign(
ctx->client_auth_vtable, ctx->hash_id, hv_len,
ctx->eng.pad, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
}
}
\ =======================================================================
: addr-ctx:
next-word { field }
"addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
postpone literal postpone ; ;
addr-ctx: min_clienthello_len
addr-ctx: hashes
addr-ctx: auth_type
addr-ctx: hash_id
\ Length of the Secure Renegotiation extension. This is 5 for the
\ first handshake, 17 for a renegotiation (if the server supports the
\ extension), or 0 if we know that the server does not support the
\ extension.
: ext-reneg-length ( -- n )
addr-reneg get8 dup if 1 - 17 * else drop 5 then ;
\ Length of SNI extension.
: ext-sni-length ( -- len )
addr-server_name strlen dup if 9 + then ;
\ Length of Maximum Fragment Length extension.
: ext-frag-length ( -- len )
addr-log_max_frag_len get8 14 = if 0 else 5 then ;
\ Length of Signatures extension.
: ext-signatures-length ( -- len )
supported-hash-functions { num } drop 0
supports-rsa-sign? if num + then
supports-ecdsa? if num + then
dup if 1 << 6 + then ;
\ Write supported hash functions ( sign -- )
: write-hashes
{ sign }
supported-hash-functions drop
\ We advertise hash functions in the following preference order:
\ SHA-256 SHA-224 SHA-384 SHA-512 SHA-1
\ Rationale:
\ -- SHA-256 and SHA-224 are more efficient on 32-bit architectures
\ -- SHA-1 is less than ideally collision-resistant
dup 0x10 and if 4 write8 sign write8 then
dup 0x08 and if 3 write8 sign write8 then
dup 0x20 and if 5 write8 sign write8 then
dup 0x40 and if 6 write8 sign write8 then
0x04 and if 2 write8 sign write8 then ;
\ Length of Supported Curves extension.
: ext-supported-curves-length ( -- len )
supported-curves dup if
0 { x }
begin dup while
dup 1 and x + >x
1 >>
repeat
drop x 1 << 6 +
then ;
\ Length of Supported Point Formats extension.
: ext-point-format-length ( -- len )
supported-curves if 6 else 0 then ;
\ Length of ALPN extension.
cc: ext-ALPN-length ( -- len ) {
size_t u, len;
if (ENG->protocol_names_num == 0) {
T0_PUSH(0);
T0_RET();
}
len = 6;
for (u = 0; u < ENG->protocol_names_num; u ++) {
len += 1 + strlen(ENG->protocol_names[u]);
}
T0_PUSH(len);
}
\ Write handshake message: ClientHello
: write-ClientHello ( -- )
{ ; total-ext-length }
\ Compute length for extensions (without the general two-byte header).
\ This does not take padding extension into account.
ext-reneg-length ext-sni-length + ext-frag-length +
ext-signatures-length +
ext-supported-curves-length + ext-point-format-length +
ext-ALPN-length +
>total-ext-length
\ ClientHello type
1 write8
\ Compute and write length
39 addr-session_id_len get8 + addr-suites_num get8 1 << +
total-ext-length if 2+ total-ext-length + then
\ Compute padding (if requested).
addr-min_clienthello_len get16 over - dup 0> if
\ We well add a Pad ClientHello extension, which has its
\ own header (4 bytes) and might be the only extension
\ (2 extra bytes for the extension list header).
total-ext-length ifnot swap 2+ swap 2- then
\ Account for the extension header.
4 - dup 0< if drop 0 then
\ Adjust total extension length.
dup 4 + total-ext-length + >total-ext-length
\ Adjust ClientHello length.
swap 4 + over + swap
else
drop
-1
then
{ ext-padding-amount }
write24
\ Protocol version
addr-version_max get16 write16
\ Client random
addr-client_random 4 bzero
addr-client_random 4 + 28 mkrand
addr-client_random 32 write-blob
\ Session ID
addr-session_id addr-session_id_len get8 write-blob-head8
\ Supported cipher suites. We also check here that we indeed
\ support all these suites.
addr-suites_num get8 dup 1 << write16
addr-suites_buf swap
begin
dup while 1-
over get16
dup suite-supported? ifnot ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
write16
swap 2+ swap
repeat
2drop
\ Compression methods (only "null" compression)
1 write8 0 write8
\ Extensions
total-ext-length if
total-ext-length write16
ext-reneg-length if
0xFF01 write16 \ extension type (0xFF01)
addr-saved_finished
ext-reneg-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
1- write-blob-head8 \ verify data
then
ext-sni-length if
0x0000 write16 \ extension type (0)
addr-server_name
ext-sni-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
2 - dup write16 \ ServerNameList length
0 write8 \ name type: host_name
3 - write-blob-head16 \ the name itself
then
ext-frag-length if
0x0001 write16 \ extension type (1)
0x0001 write16 \ extension length
addr-log_max_frag_len get8 8 - write8
then
ext-signatures-length if
0x000D write16 \ extension type (13)
ext-signatures-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
2 - write16 \ list length
supports-ecdsa? if 3 write-hashes then
supports-rsa-sign? if 1 write-hashes then
then
\ TODO: add an API to specify preference order for curves.
\ Right now we send Curve25519 first, then other curves in
\ increasing ID values (hence P-256 in second).
ext-supported-curves-length dup if
0x000A write16 \ extension type (10)
4 - dup write16 \ extension length
2- write16 \ list length
supported-curves 0
dup 0x20000000 and if
0xDFFFFFFF and 29 write16
then
begin dup 32 < while
dup2 >> 1 and if dup write16 then
1+
repeat
2drop
else
drop
then
ext-point-format-length if
0x000B write16 \ extension type (11)
0x0002 write16 \ extension length
0x0100 write16 \ value: 1 format: uncompressed
then
ext-ALPN-length dup if
0x0010 write16 \ extension type (16)
4 - dup write16 \ extension length
2- write16 \ list length
addr-protocol_names_num get16 0
begin
dup2 > while
dup copy-protocol-name
dup write8 addr-pad swap write-blob
1+
repeat
2drop
else
drop
then
ext-padding-amount 0< ifnot
0x0015 write16 \ extension value (21)
ext-padding-amount
dup write16 \ extension length
begin dup while
1- 0 write8 repeat \ value (only zeros)
drop
then
then
;
\ =======================================================================
\ Parse server SNI extension. If present, then it should be empty.
: read-server-sni ( lim -- lim )
read16 if ERR_BAD_SNI fail then ;
\ Parse server Max Fragment Length extension. If present, then it should
\ advertise the same length as the client. Note that whether the server
\ sends it or not changes nothing for us: we won't send any record larger
\ than the advertised value anyway, and we will accept incoming records
\ up to our input buffer length.
: read-server-frag ( lim -- lim )
read16 1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then
read8 8 + addr-log_max_frag_len get8 = ifnot ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then ;
\ Parse server Secure Renegotiation extension. This is called only if
\ the client sent that extension, so we only have two cases to
\ distinguish: first handshake, and renegotiation; in the latter case,
\ we know that the server supports the extension, otherwise the client
\ would not have sent it.
: read-server-reneg ( lim -- lim )
read16
addr-reneg get8 ifnot
\ "reneg" is 0, so this is a first handshake. The server's
\ extension MUST be empty. We also learn that the server
\ supports the extension.
1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
read8 0 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
2 addr-reneg set8
else
\ "reneg" is non-zero, and we sent an extension, so it must
\ be 2 and this is a renegotiation. We must verify that
\ the extension contents have length exactly 24 bytes and
\ match the saved client and server "Finished".
25 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
read8 24 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
addr-pad 24 read-blob
addr-saved_finished addr-pad 24 memcmp ifnot
ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail
then
then ;
\ Read the ALPN extension from the server. It must contain a single name,
\ and that name must match one of our names.
: read-ALPN-from-server ( lim -- lim )
\ Extension contents length.
read16 open-elt
\ Length of list of names.
read16 open-elt
\ There should be a single name.
read8 addr-pad swap dup { len } read-blob
close-elt
close-elt
len test-protocol-name dup 0< if
3 flag? if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
drop
else
1+ addr-selected_protocol set16
then ;
\ Save a value in a 16-bit field, or check it in case of session resumption.
: check-resume ( val addr resume -- )
if get16 = ifnot ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH fail then else set16 then ;
cc: DEBUG-BLOB ( addr len -- ) {
extern int printf(const char *fmt, ...);
size_t len = T0_POP();
unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
size_t u;
printf("BLOB:");
for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
if (u % 16 == 0) {
printf("\n ");
}
printf(" %02x", buf[u]);
}
printf("\n");
}
\ Parse incoming ServerHello. Returned value is true (-1) on session
\ resumption.
: read-ServerHello ( -- bool )
\ Get header, and check message type.
read-handshake-header 2 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
\ Get protocol version.
read16 { version }
version addr-version_min get16 < version addr-version_max get16 > or if
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION fail
then
\ Enforce chosen version for subsequent records in both directions.
version addr-version_in get16 <> if ERR_BAD_VERSION fail then
version addr-version_out set16
\ Server random.
addr-server_random 32 read-blob
\ The "session resumption" flag.
0 { resume }
\ Session ID.
read8 { idlen }
idlen 32 > if ERR_OVERSIZED_ID fail then
addr-pad idlen read-blob
idlen addr-session_id_len get8 = idlen 0 > and if
addr-session_id addr-pad idlen memcmp if
\ Server session ID is non-empty and matches what
\ we sent, so this is a session resumption.
-1 >resume
then
then
addr-session_id addr-pad idlen memcpy
idlen addr-session_id_len set8
\ Record version.
version addr-version resume check-resume
\ Cipher suite. We check that it is part of the list of cipher
\ suites that we advertised.
read16
dup scan-suite 0< if ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
\ Also check that the cipher suite is compatible with the
\ announced version: suites that don't use HMAC/SHA-1 are
\ for TLS-1.2 only, not older versions.
dup use-tls12? version 0x0303 < and if ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
addr-cipher_suite resume check-resume
\ Compression method. Should be 0 (no compression).
read8 if ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION fail then
\ Parse extensions (if any). If there is no extension, then the
\ read limit (on the TOS) should be 0 at that point.
dup if
\ Length of extension list.
\ message size.
read16 open-elt
\ Enumerate extensions. For each of them, check that we
\ sent an extension of that type, and did not see it
\ yet; and then process it.
ext-sni-length { ok-sni }
ext-reneg-length { ok-reneg }
ext-frag-length { ok-frag }
ext-signatures-length { ok-signatures }
ext-supported-curves-length { ok-curves }
ext-point-format-length { ok-points }
ext-ALPN-length { ok-ALPN }
begin dup while
read16
case
\ Server Name Indication. The server may
\ send such an extension if it uses the SNI
\ from the client, but that "response
\ extension" is supposed to be empty.
0x0000 of
ok-sni ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-sni
read-server-sni
endof
\ Max Frag Length. The contents shall be
\ a single byte whose value matches the one
\ sent by the client.
0x0001 of
ok-frag ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-frag
read-server-frag
endof
\ Secure Renegotiation.
0xFF01 of
ok-reneg ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-reneg
read-server-reneg
endof
\ Signature Algorithms.
\ Normally, the server should never send this
\ extension (so says RFC 5246 #7.4.1.4.1),
\ but some existing servers do.
0x000D of
ok-signatures ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-signatures
read-ignore-16
endof
\ Supported Curves.
0x000A of
ok-curves ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-curves
read-ignore-16
endof
\ Supported Point Formats.
0x000B of
ok-points ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-points
read-ignore-16
endof
\ ALPN.
0x0010 of
ok-ALPN ifnot
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
then
0 >ok-ALPN
read-ALPN-from-server
endof
ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
endcase
repeat
\ If we sent a secure renegotiation extension but did not
\ receive a response, then the server does not support
\ secure renegotiation. This is a hard failure if this
\ is a renegotiation.
ok-reneg if
ok-reneg 5 > if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
1 addr-reneg set8
then
close-elt
else
\ No extension received at all, so the server does not
\ support secure renegotiation. This is a hard failure
\ if the server was previously known to support it (i.e.
\ this is a renegotiation).
ext-reneg-length 5 > if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
1 addr-reneg set8
then
close-elt
resume
;
cc: set-server-curve ( -- ) {
const br_x509_class *xc;
const br_x509_pkey *pk;
xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
pk = xc->get_pkey(ENG->x509ctx, NULL);
CTX->server_curve =
(pk->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_EC) ? pk->key.ec.curve : 0;
}
\ Read Certificate message from server.
: read-Certificate-from-server ( -- )
addr-cipher_suite get16 expected-key-type
-1 read-Certificate
dup 0< if neg fail then
dup ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
over and <> if ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE fail then
\ Set server curve (used for static ECDH).
set-server-curve ;
\ Verify signature on ECDHE point sent by the server.
\ 'hash' is the hash function to use (1 to 6, or 0 for RSA with MD5+SHA-1)
\ 'use-rsa' is 0 for ECDSA, -1 for for RSA
\ 'sig-len' is the signature length (in bytes)
\ The signature itself is in the pad.
cc: verify-SKE-sig ( hash use-rsa sig-len -- err ) {
size_t sig_len = T0_POP();
int use_rsa = T0_POPi();
int hash = T0_POPi();
T0_PUSH(verify_SKE_sig(CTX, hash, use_rsa, sig_len));
}
\ Parse ServerKeyExchange
: read-ServerKeyExchange ( -- )
\ Get header, and check message type.
read-handshake-header 12 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
\ We expect a named curve, and we must support it.
read8 3 = ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
read16 dup addr-ecdhe_curve set8
dup 32 >= if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
supported-curves swap >> 1 and ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
\ Read the server point.
read8
dup 133 > if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
dup addr-ecdhe_point_len set8
addr-ecdhe_point swap read-blob
\ If using TLS-1.2+, then the hash function and signature algorithm
\ are explicitly provided; the signature algorithm must match what
\ the cipher suite specifies. With TLS-1.0 and 1.1, the signature
\ algorithm is inferred from the cipher suite, and the hash is
\ either MD5+SHA-1 (for RSA signatures) or SHA-1 (for ECDSA).
addr-version get16 0x0303 >= { tls1.2+ }
addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-ecdhe? { use-rsa }
2 { hash }
tls1.2+ if
\ Read hash function; accept only the SHA-* identifiers
\ (from SHA-1 to SHA-512, no MD5 here).
read8
dup dup 2 < swap 6 > or if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
>hash
read8
\ Get expected signature algorithm and compare with what
\ the server just sent. Expected value is 1 for RSA, 3
\ for ECDSA. Note that 'use-rsa' evaluates to -1 for RSA,
\ 0 for ECDSA.
use-rsa 1 << 3 + = ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
else
\ For MD5+SHA-1, we set 'hash' to 0.
use-rsa if 0 >hash then
then
\ Read signature into the pad.
read16 dup { sig-len }
dup 512 > if ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail then
addr-pad swap read-blob
\ Verify signature.
hash use-rsa sig-len verify-SKE-sig
dup if fail then drop
close-elt ;
\ Client certificate: start processing of anchor names.
cc: anchor-dn-start-name-list ( -- ) {
if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
(*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->start_name_list(
CTX->client_auth_vtable);
}
}
\ Client certificate: start a new anchor DN (length is 16-bit).
cc: anchor-dn-start-name ( length -- ) {
size_t len;
len = T0_POP();
if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
(*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->start_name(
CTX->client_auth_vtable, len);
}
}
\ Client certificate: push some data for current anchor DN.
cc: anchor-dn-append-name ( length -- ) {
size_t len;
len = T0_POP();
if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
(*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->append_name(
CTX->client_auth_vtable, ENG->pad, len);
}
}
\ Client certificate: end current anchor DN.
cc: anchor-dn-end-name ( -- ) {
if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
(*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->end_name(
CTX->client_auth_vtable);
}
}
\ Client certificate: end list of anchor DN.
cc: anchor-dn-end-name-list ( -- ) {
if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
(*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->end_name_list(
CTX->client_auth_vtable);
}
}
\ Client certificate: obtain the client certificate chain.
cc: get-client-chain ( auth_types -- ) {
uint32_t auth_types;
auth_types = T0_POP();
if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
br_ssl_client_certificate ux;
(*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->choose(CTX->client_auth_vtable,
CTX, auth_types, &ux);
CTX->auth_type = (unsigned char)ux.auth_type;
CTX->hash_id = (unsigned char)ux.hash_id;
ENG->chain = ux.chain;
ENG->chain_len = ux.chain_len;
} else {
CTX->hash_id = 0;
ENG->chain_len = 0;
}
}
\ Parse CertificateRequest. Header has already been read.
: read-contents-CertificateRequest ( lim -- )
\ Read supported client authentication types. We keep only
\ RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH.
0 { auth_types }
read8 open-elt
begin dup while
read8 case
1 of 0x0000FF endof
64 of 0x00FF00 endof
65 of 0x010000 endof
66 of 0x020000 endof
0 swap
endcase
auth_types or >auth_types
repeat
close-elt
\ Full static ECDH is allowed only if the cipher suite is ECDH
\ (not ECDHE). It would be theoretically feasible to use static
\ ECDH on the client side with an ephemeral key pair from the
\ server, but RFC 4492 (section 3) forbids it because ECDHE suites
\ are supposed to provide forward secrecy, and static ECDH would
\ negate that property.
addr-cipher_suite get16 use-ecdh? ifnot
auth_types 0xFFFF and >auth_types
then
\ Note: if the cipher suite is ECDH, then the X.509 validation
\ engine was invoked with the BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX
\ combination, so the server's public key has already been
\ checked to be fit for a key exchange.
\ With TLS 1.2:
\ - rsa_fixed_ecdh and ecdsa_fixed_ecdh are synoymous.
\ - There is an explicit list of supported sign+hash.
\ With TLS 1.0,
addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
\ With TLS 1.2:
\ - There is an explicit list of supported sign+hash.
\ - The ECDH flags must be adjusted for RSA/ECDSA
\ support.
read-list-sign-algos dup addr-hashes set32
\ Trim down the list depending on what hash functions
\ we support (since the hashing itself is done by the SSL
\ engine, not by the certificate handler).
supported-hash-functions drop dup 8 << or 0x030000 or and
auth_types and
auth_types 0x030000 and if
dup 0x0000FF and if 0x010000 or then
dup 0x00FF00 and if 0x020000 or then
then
>auth_types
else
\ TLS 1.0 or 1.1. The hash function is fixed for signatures
\ (MD5+SHA-1 for RSA, SHA-1 for ECDSA).
auth_types 0x030401 and >auth_types
then
\ Parse list of anchor DN.
anchor-dn-start-name-list
read16 open-elt
begin dup while
read16 open-elt
dup anchor-dn-start-name
\ We read the DN by chunks through the pad, so
\ as to use the existing reading function (read-blob)
\ that also ensures proper hashing.
begin
dup while
dup 256 > if 256 else dup then { len }
addr-pad len read-blob
len anchor-dn-append-name
repeat
close-elt
anchor-dn-end-name
repeat
close-elt
anchor-dn-end-name-list
\ We should have reached the message end.
close-elt
\ Obtain the client chain.
auth_types get-client-chain
;
\ (obsolete)
\ Write an empty Certificate message.
\ : write-empty-Certificate ( -- )
\ 11 write8 3 write24 0 write24 ;
cc: do-rsa-encrypt ( prf_id -- nlen ) {
int x;
x = make_pms_rsa(CTX, T0_POP());
if (x < 0) {
br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
T0_CO();
} else {
T0_PUSH(x);
}
}
cc: do-ecdh ( echde prf_id -- ulen ) {
unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
unsigned ecdhe = T0_POP();
int x;
x = make_pms_ecdh(CTX, ecdhe, prf_id);
if (x < 0) {
br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
T0_CO();
} else {
T0_PUSH(x);
}
}
cc: do-static-ecdh ( prf-id -- ) {
unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
if (make_pms_static_ecdh(CTX, prf_id) < 0) {
br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
T0_CO();
}
}
cc: do-client-sign ( -- sig_len ) {
size_t sig_len;
sig_len = make_client_sign(CTX);
if (sig_len == 0) {
br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
T0_CO();
}
T0_PUSH(sig_len);
}
\ Write ClientKeyExchange.
: write-ClientKeyExchange ( -- )
16 write8
addr-cipher_suite get16
dup use-rsa-keyx? if
prf-id do-rsa-encrypt
dup 2+ write24
dup write16
addr-pad swap write-blob
else
dup use-ecdhe? swap prf-id do-ecdh
dup 1+ write24
dup write8
addr-pad swap write-blob
then ;
\ Write CertificateVerify. This is invoked only if a client certificate
\ was requested and sent, and the authentication is not full static ECDH.
: write-CertificateVerify ( -- )
do-client-sign
15 write8 dup
addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
4 + write24
addr-hash_id get8 write8
addr-auth_type get8 write8
else
2+ write24
then
dup write16 addr-pad swap write-blob ;
\ =======================================================================
\ Perform a handshake.
: do-handshake ( -- )
0 addr-application_data set8
22 addr-record_type_out set8
0 addr-selected_protocol set16
multihash-init
write-ClientHello
flush-record
read-ServerHello
if
\ Session resumption.
-1 read-CCS-Finished
-1 write-CCS-Finished
else
\ Not a session resumption.
\ Read certificate; then check key type and usages against
\ cipher suite.
read-Certificate-from-server
\ Depending on cipher suite, we may now expect a
\ ServerKeyExchange.
addr-cipher_suite get16 expected-key-type
CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } and if
read-ServerKeyExchange
then
\ Get next header.
read-handshake-header
\ If this is a CertificateRequest, parse it, then read
\ next header.
dup 13 = if
drop read-contents-CertificateRequest
read-handshake-header
-1
else
0
then
{ seen-CR }
\ At that point, we should have a ServerHelloDone,
\ whose length must be 0.
14 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
if ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE fail then
\ There should not be more bytes in the record at that point.
more-incoming-bytes? if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
seen-CR if
\ If the server requested a client certificate, then
\ we must write a Certificate message (it may be
\ empty).
write-Certificate
\ If using static ECDH, then the ClientKeyExchange
\ is empty, and there is no CertificateVerify.
\ Otherwise, there is a ClientKeyExchange; there
\ will then be a CertificateVerify if a client chain
\ was indeed sent.
addr-hash_id get8 0xFF = if
drop
16 write8 0 write24
addr-cipher_suite get16 prf-id do-static-ecdh
else
write-ClientKeyExchange
if write-CertificateVerify then
then
else
write-ClientKeyExchange
then
-1 write-CCS-Finished
-1 read-CCS-Finished
then
\ Now we should be invoked only in case of renegotiation.
1 addr-application_data set8
23 addr-record_type_out set8 ;
\ Read a HelloRequest message.
: read-HelloRequest ( -- )
\ A HelloRequest has length 0 and type 0.
read-handshake-header-core
if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
if ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE fail then ;
\ Entry point.
: main ( -- ! )
\ Perform initial handshake.
do-handshake
begin
\ Wait for further invocation. At that point, we should
\ get either an explicit call for renegotiation, or
\ an incoming HelloRequest handshake message.
wait-co
dup 0x07 and case
0x00 of
0x10 and if
do-handshake
then
endof
0x01 of
drop
0 addr-application_data set8
read-HelloRequest
\ Reject renegotiations if the peer does not
\ support secure renegotiation, or if the
\ "no renegotiation" flag is set.
addr-reneg get8 1 = 1 flag? or if
flush-record
begin can-output? not while
wait-co drop
repeat
100 send-warning
\ We rejected the renegotiation,
\ but the connection is not dead.
\ We must set back things into
\ working "application data" state.
1 addr-application_data set8
23 addr-record_type_out set8
else
do-handshake
then
endof
ERR_UNEXPECTED fail
endcase
again
;
|