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authorJohn Wickerson <j.wickerson@imperial.ac.uk>2021-08-14 12:19:13 +0000
committernode <node@git-bridge-prod-0>2021-08-18 05:52:26 +0000
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downloadoopsla21_fvhls-02cad5f3082fb3661a121be62c09b8356e36a584.tar.gz
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Update on Overleaf.
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The contributions of this paper are as follows:
\item In Section~\ref{sec:proof}, we describe how we proved the correctness theorem. The proof follows standard \compcert{} techniques -- forward simulations, intermediate specifications, and determinism results -- but we encountered several challenges peculiar to our hardware-oriented setting. %\NR{`specific' is better than `peculiar'?} %JW: I think this is a nice use of peculiar. Note that it means `distinctive' here, not `weird' -- the third meaning at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/peculiar
These include handling discrepancies between the byte-addressed memory assumed by the input software and the word-addressed memory that we implement in the output hardware, different handling of unsigned comparisons between C and Verilog, and carefully implementing memory reads and writes so that these behave properly as a RAM in hardware.
%\JW{Not sure `rearranging' is quite the right word. Sounds like you're rearranging independent reads/writes w.r.t. each other. Maybe change `correctly rearranging' to `carefully implementing'?}
- \item In Section~\ref{sec:evaluation}, we evaluate \vericert{} on the \polybench{} benchmark suite~\cite{polybench}, and compare the performance of our generated hardware against an existing, unverified HLS tool called \legup{}~\cite{canis11_legup}. We show that \vericert{} generates hardware that is \slowdownOrig$\times$ slower (\slowdownDiv$\times$ slower in the absence of division) and \areaIncr$\times$ larger than that generated by \legup{}. This performance gap can be largely attributed to \vericert{}'s current lack of support for instruction-level parallelism and the absence of an efficient, pipelined division operator. We intend to close this gap in the future by introducing (and verifying) HLS optimisations of our own, such as scheduling and memory analysis. %\NR{Question rather than comment: Will there be verification issues to add support for hard IPs like division blocks?}\YH{Not really any issues, just many different levels of reliability. You don't have to prove IP correct, but theoretically could.}
+ \item In Section~\ref{sec:evaluation}, we evaluate \vericert{} on the \polybench{} benchmark suite~\cite{polybench}, and compare the performance of our generated hardware against an existing, unverified HLS tool called \legup{}~\cite{canis11_legup}. We show that \vericert{} generates hardware that is \slowdownOrig$\times$ slower (\slowdownDiv$\times$ slower in the absence of division) and \areaIncr$\times$ larger than that generated by \legup{}. This performance gap can be largely attributed to \vericert{}'s current lack of support for instruction-level parallelism and the absence of an efficient, pipelined division operator. We intend to close this gap in the future by introducing (and verifying) HLS optimisations of our own, such as scheduling and memory analysis. \JW{This section also reports on our campaign to fuzz-test \vericert{} using over a hundred thousand random C programs generated by Csmith~\cite{yang11_findin_under_bugs_c_compil} in order to confirm that its correctness theorem is watertight.} %\NR{Question rather than comment: Will there be verification issues to add support for hard IPs like division blocks?}\YH{Not really any issues, just many different levels of reliability. You don't have to prove IP correct, but theoretically could.}
\end{itemize}
%\JW{This sentence seems pretty good to me; is it up-to-date with the latest `challenges' you've faced?}
\vericert{} is fully open source and available online.